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Abstract
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher
education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the
computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to schools.
Our model is motivated by a particular characteristic of the education system in many
countries where each teacher specializes in two subjects. We seek stable matchings,
which ensure that no teacher and school have the incentive to deviate from their
assignments. Indeed we propose two stability definitions depending on the precise
format of schools’ preferences. If the schools’ ranking of applicants is independent of
their subjects of specialism, we show that the problem of deciding whether a stable
matching exists is NP-complete, even if there are only three subjects, unless there are
master lists of applicants or of schools. By contrast, if the schools may order applicants
differently in each of their specialization subjects, the problem of deciding whether a
stable matching exists is NP-complete even in the presence of subject-specific master
lists plus a master list of schools. Finally, we prove a strong inapproximability result
for the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs
with respect to both stability definitions.
Keywords: stable matchings, serial dictatorship, NP-completeness, polynomial-time
algorithm, inapproximability
1 Introduction
In the organization of education, several countries or regions use various centralized
schemes to allocate children to public schools (e.g., in Boston and New York [2, 1]),
students to universities (e.g., in Hungary [6]), and intending junior doctors to training po-
sitions in hospitals (e.g., in the USA [21]), etc. These schemes are usually not dictatorial
in the sense that they take into account the wishes of both sides of the market: students
may express their preferences over the universities they wish to attend, and the universi-
ties may order their applicants based on some kind of evaluation. After analyzing several
∗This work was supported by VEGA grants 1/0344/14 and 1/0142/15 (Cechla´rova´), by OTKA grant
K108383 and the ELTE-MTA Egerva´ry Research Group (Fleiner), by EPSRC grant EP/K010042/1
(Manlove) and by a SICSA Prize Studentship (McBride). The authors also gratefully acknowledge the
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successful and unsuccessful schemes Roth [17, 18] convincingly argued that a crucial prop-
erty for success is so-called stability, introduced in the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley
[10]. Stability means that no unmatched student–school pair should simultaneously prefer
each other to their current assignee(s) (if any). In many real markets, each instance not
only admits a stable matching, but it is also possible to find such a matching efficiently.
However, sometimes there are circumstances leading to additional structural require-
ments. For example, married couples may wish to be allocated to the same hospital or
at least to hospitals that are geographically close [15], or schools may wish to have the
right to close a study programme if the number of applicants does not meet a certain
lower quota [6]. In such cases, a suitable notion of stability has to be defined that really
mirrors the intentions of the participants and motivates them to obey the recommended
assignment. Alas, a stable matching is not necessarily bound to exist; and even worse, it
is often a computationally difficult problem to decide whether in the given situation one
does exist [16].
The topic of this paper is motivated by the problems arising in the labour market for
teachers. Traditionally, a teacher for the upper elementary or lower secondary level of
education in Slovakia and the Czech republic (and in fact in many other countries and
regions, such as Germany [4] and Flanders [9]) specializes in two curricular domains (from
now on called subjects), e.g., Mathematics and Physics, Chemistry and Biology, or Slovak
language and English etc. When a school is looking for new teachers, it may have different
numbers of lessons (or teaching hours) to cover at each subject. Thus we suppose that
each school has different capacity for each subject and that it will be willing to employ a
set of teachers in such a way that these capacities will not be exceeded. Cechla´rova´ et al.
[8] studied a variant of this problem where the tranee-teachers could only express which
schools are acceptable for them and which not without ordering them according to their
preferences and the schools had no say. In these settings, the aim was to assign as many
trainee-teachers as possible (ideally all of them) by respecting the schools capacities.
The aim of this paper is to study algorithmic aspects of the problem of assigning teach-
ers to schools within the framework of two-sided preferences. We suppose that teachers
rank order their acceptable schools according to their own criteria, and vice versa, schools
rank order their applicants similarly [14]. In this context we suggest two stability defini-
tions and study the computational complexity of problems concerned with finding stable
matchings (or reporting that none exist). These definitions and the associated complexity
results depend on the nature of the schools’ preference lists.
The main results and the organization of the rest of the paper are as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce relevant technical concepts and illustrate them by means of simple
examples. In Section 3 we deal with the case when each school has a linear ordering
on the set of teachers who apply for a position. We show that in this general case the
problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if there are only
three subjects in total. By contrast, if either the preferences of schools are derived from a
common master list of teachers, or vice versa, if the preferences of teachers are derived from
a common master list of schools, a unique stable matching exists and it can be found using
straightforward extensions of the classical serial Dictatorship mechanism [19]. Moreover,
the problems with master lists are efficiently solvable without any restrictions on the
number of subjects. In Section 5 we modify the stability definition to enable the schools
to order the teachers differently according to their two specialization subjects. We show
that in this case, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete
even if there are only three subjects, there are master lists for each subject and there is
also a master list of schools. Problems involving finding matchings with the minimum
number of blocking pairs are discussed in Section 6. Finally Section 7 summarizes our
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findings and suggests some questions for further research.
2 Preliminary definitions and observations
An instance of the Teachers Assignment Problem, tap for short, involves a set A of
applicants (teachers), a set S of schools and a set P of subjects. For ease of exposition,
elements of the set P will sometimes be referred to by letters like M , F or I to remind the
reader of real subjects taught at schools, such as Mathematics, Physics, or Informatics,
etc.
Each applicant a ∈ A is characterized by a pair of distinct subjects p(a) ⊆ P , where
p(a) = {p1(a), p2(a)}, that define her type. Sometimes we shall also say that a particular
applicant is of type FM , IM , or FI, etc. Corresponding to each applicant a ∈ A there
is a set S(a) ⊆ S of schools that a finds acceptable. Moreover applicant a ranks S(a) in
strict order of preference.
Each school s ∈ S has a certain capacity for each subject: the vector of capacities will
be denoted by c(s) = (c1(s), . . . , ck(s)) ∈ N
k, where k = |P |, and an entry of c(s) will be
called the partial capacity of school s. Here, ci(s) is the maximum number of applicants,
whose specialization involves subject pi, that school s is able to take.
Let S(A) = {(a, s) : a ∈ A ∧ s ∈ S(a)} denote the set of acceptable applicant–school
pairs. An assignment M is a subset of S(A) such that each applicant a ∈ A is a member
of at most one pair in M. We shall write M(a) = s if (a, s) ∈ M and say that applicant
a is assigned to school s and M(a) = ∅ if there is no s ∈ S with (a, s) ∈ M. The set
of applicants assigned to a school s will be denoted by M(s) = {a ∈ A : (a, s) ∈ M}.
We shall also denote by Mp(s) the set of applicants assigned to s whose specialization
includes subject p and by Mp,r(s) the set of applicants assigned to s whose specialization
is exactly the pair {p, r}. More precisely,
Mp(s) = {a ∈ A : (a, s) ∈ M ∧ p ∈ p(a)}
and
Mp,r(s) = {a ∈ A : (a, s) ∈ M ∧ {p, r} = p(a)}.
An assignment M is a matching if |Mp(s)| ≤ cp(s) for each school s and each subject p.
We say that an applicant a is assigned in M if M(a) 6= ∅, otherwise she is unassigned.
A school s is full in a matching M if it can admit no other student (irrespective of her
specialization) and that it is undersubscribed in subject p if |Mp(s)| < cp(s).
Definition 1. Let M be a matching. We say that a pair (a, s) with p(a) = {p1, p2} and
s ∈ S(a) is blocking if a is not assigned in M or a prefers s to M(a) and one of the
following conditions hold:
(i) s is undersubscribed in both p1 and p2,
(ii) s is undersubscribed in pi and it prefers a to one applicant in Mp3−i(s) for some
i ∈ {1, 2},
(iii) s prefers a to one applicant in Mp1,p2(s),
(iv) s prefers a to two different applicants a1, a2 such that a1 ∈ Mp1(s) and a2 ∈ Mp2(s).
A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
Example 1. Let J1 be the instance of tap with the set of subjects P = {F, I,M} given
in Figure 1.
Consider the matching M = {(a1, s3), (a2, s1), (a3, s2), (a4, s1)}. It is easy to see that M
is not stable. Each of the conditions (i) − (iv) of Definition 1 is violated by the following
blocking pairs, respectively:
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applicant type preferences school capacities preferences
F I M
a1 MF s1, s3 s1 2 1 1 a3, a4, a1, a2
a2 MF s1, s3 s2 1 1 1 a4, a3
a3 MI s1, s2 s3 2 1 1 a4, a1, a2
a4 IF s3, s2, s1
Figure 1: Instance J1 of tap
(i) (a4, s3) is a blocking pair since a4 prefers school s3 to M(a4) = s1, and s3 is under-
subscribed in both I and F ,
(ii) (a4, s2) is a blocking pair since a4 prefers s2 to M(a4) = s1, school s2 is undersub-
scribed in F and it prefers a4 to a3 ∈ M(s2),
(iii) (a1, s1) is a blocking pair since a1 prefers s1 to M(a1) = s3, and school s1 prefers a3
to a2 ∈ M(s1) who is of the same type as a1,
(iv) (a3, s1) is a blocking pair since a3 prefers s1 to M(a1) = s2, and school s1 prefers a2
to both its asignees a2 and a4.
Note that Definition 1 (iv), as also illustrated in Example 1, gives rise to the possibility
that a school could drop two applicants and accept just one in order to satisfy a blocking
pair. This is also a possibility in the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples where a
single resident r can displace a couple c assigned to a hospital h if h prefers r to just one
member of c [7].
We also remark that tap bears a superficial resemblance to the variant of the Hospitals
/ Residents problem that modelled the problem of assigning junior doctors to hospitals
in Scotland in years 2000-2005, where intending junior doctors sought not one position at
hospitals, but two, namely a medical post and a surgical post [12]. They also typically
had preferences over the half-years in which they would carry out each type of post, so
the stability definition was different to the one given in Definition 1.
We next present two examples to show that a tap instance need not admit a stable
matching, and in such instances that do, stable matchings may have different sizes.
Example 2. Consider the instance J2 of tap given in Figure 2. We show that J2 admits
no stable matching. If M(a1) = s2 then assigning a2 to s1 leads to the blocking pair
(a3, s1) and assigning a3 to s1 produces blocking pair (a2, s2). By contrast, if M(a1) = s1
then a2 must also be assigned to s1 (this schools is her first choice and it has enough place
to accept her), which makes the pair (a1, s2) blocking. Hence no stable matching exists.
applicant type preferences school capacities preferences
F I M
a1 FM s2, s1 s1 1 1 2 a1, a3, a2
a2 IM s1, s2 s2 1 1 1 a2, a1
a3 FI s1
Figure 2: An instance J2 of tap with no stable matching
Example 3. Consider the instance J3 of tap given in Figure 3. It is straightforward to
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verify that M1 = {(a1, s2), (a2, s1)}, of size 2, and M2 = {(a1, s1), (a2, s2), (a3, s1)}, of
size 3, are both stable in J3. Hence J3 admits stable matchings of different sizes.
applicant type preferences school capacities preferences
F I M
a1 FM s2, s1 s1 1 1 2 a1, a2, a3
a2 FI s1, s2 s2 1 1 1 a2, a1
a3 IM s1
Figure 3: An instance J3 of tap with stable matchings of different sizes
3 NP-hardness of TAP
Theorem 1. Given an instance of tap, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching
exists, is NP-complete. This result holds even if there are at most three subjects, each
partial capacity of a school is at most 2, and the preference list of each applicant is of
length at most 3.
Proof. It is easy to see that tap belongs to NP, since when given an assignment, it can
be checked in polynomial time that it is a matching and that it is stable. To prove
completeness, we reduce from a restricted version of sat. Let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the
problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF in which each clause contains
exactly 3 literals and, for each variable vi, each of literals vi and v¯i appears exactly twice
in B, whether B is satisfiable. Berman et al. [5] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
Hence let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and clauses in B, respectively. Let us construct
an instance J of tap in the following way.
There are 3 subjects, namely F , I and M . For each variable vi there are 6 applicants
a1i , a
2
i , . . . , a
6
i , 4 applicants x
1
i , x
2
i , y
1
i , y
2
i , 12 applicants q
k
i,1, q
k
i,2, q
k
i,3 (1 ≤ k ≤ 4), 6 schools
s1i , s
2
i , s
3
i , s
4
i , s
T
i , s
F
i and 12 schools w
k
i,1, w
k
i,2, w
k
i,3 (1 ≤ k ≤ 4). For each clause cj there is
one school zj . Applicants x
1
i and x
2
i correspond to the first and to the second occurrence
of literal vi, and applicants y
1
i and y
2
i correspond to the first and to the second occurrence
of literal v¯i, respectively.
The characteristics of applicants and schools and their preferences are given in Figure
4. Here, the subscripts and superscripts involving i, j and k range over the following
intervals: 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ 4. In the preference list of school zj ,
the symbol vsj means the x- or y-applicant that corresponds to the literal that appears in
position s of clause cj . Conversely, in the preference list of x- or y-applicants the symbol
c(.) denotes the z-school corresponding to the clause containing the corresponding literal.
Also, in the preference list of wki,3, the symbol A(w
k
i,3) denotes x
k
i if 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 and denotes
yk−2i if 3 ≤ k ≤ 4.
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) let us denote
Ti = {(x
1
i , s
T
i ), (x
2
i , s
T
i ), (a
6
i , s
F
i )}, Fi = {(y
1
i , s
F
i ), (y
2
i , s
F
i ), (a
5
i , s
T
i )}.
Now, let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matchingM in J as follows.
For each variable vi ∈ V , if vi is true under f , put the pairs Ti into M and if vi is false
under f put the pairs Fi into M. In the former case add the pairs
(y1i , c(y
1
i )), (y
2
i , c(y
2
i )), (a
1
i , s
1
i ), (a
2
i , s
4
i ), (a
3
i , s
2
i ), (a
4
i , s
2
i ), (a
5
i , s
3
i ),
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applicant type preferences school capacities preferences
F I M
a1i FI s
1
i , s
3
i s
1
i 1 1 2 a
4
i , a
1
i , a
3
i
a2i FI s
2
i , s
4
i s
2
i 1 1 2 a
3
i , a
2
i , a
4
i
a3i FM s
1
i , s
2
i s
3
i 1 1 0 a
1
i , a
5
i
a4i IM s
2
i , s
1
i s
4
i 1 1 0 a
2
i , a
6
i
a5i FI s
3
i , s
T
i s
T
i 1 1 2 a
5
i , x
1
i , x
2
i
a6i FI s
4
i , s
F
i s
F
i 1 1 2 a
6
i , y
1
i , y
2
i
x1i FM s
T
i , c(x
1
i ), w
1
i,3 w
k
i,1 1 1 2 q
k
i,1, q
k
i,3, q
k
i,2
x2i IM s
T
i , c(x
2
i ), w
2
i,3 w
k
i,2 1 1 2 q
k
i,2, q
k
i,1
y1i FM s
F
i , c(y
1
i ), w
3
i,3 w
k
i,3 1 1 1 A(w
k
i,3), q
k
i,3
y2i IM s
F
i , c(y
2
i ), w
4
i,3 zj 2 2 2 v
1
j , v
2
j , v
3
j
qki,1 FM w
k
i,2, w
k
i,1
qki,2 IM w
k
i,1, w
k
i,2
qki,3 FI w
k
i,3, w
k
i,1
Figure 4: The tap instance constructed in the proof of Theorem 1.
and in the latter case add the pairs
(x1i , c(x
1
i )), (x
2
i , c(x
2
i )), (a
1
i , s
3
i ), (a
2
i , s
2
i ), (a
3
i , s
1
i ), (a
4
i , s
1
i ), (a
6
i , s
4
i ).
Notice that as each clause cj ∈ C contains at most two false literals, school zj has enough
capacity for accepting all the allocated applicants. Finally, add the following pairs for
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and k (1 ≤ k ≤ 4):
(qki,1, w
k
i,2), (q
k
i,2, w
k
i,1), (q
k
i,3, w
k
i,3).
It is obvious that the defined assignment is a matching; it remains to prove that it is
stable. We show this by considering each type of applicants corresponding to variable vi
in turn. Firstly we remark that applicants qki,1, q
k
i,2, q
k
i,3 each have their first choice school
(1 ≤ k ≤ 4) so cannot be involved in a blocking pair. Now suppose that vi is true under
f . Then:
• applicants x1i , x
2
i , a
1
i , a
4
i and a
5
i have their most-preferred schools, so are not blocking;
• applicants y1i and y
2
i prefer school s
F
i , but this school is assigned a
6
i , whom it prefers;
• applicant a2i prefers school s
2
i , but this school is assigned a
3
i , whom it prefers;
• applicant a3i prefers school s
1
i , but this school is assigned a
1
i , whom it prefers;
• applicant a6i prefers school s
4
i , but this school is assigned a
2
i , whom it prefers.
The case of a false variable can be proved similarly.
For the converse implication let us first prove two lemmata.
Lemma 1. Each stable matching M in J contains for each i either all the pairs in Ti or
all the pairs in Fi.
6
Proof. Let M be a stable matching. Fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Notice first that both schools
sTi and s
F
i must be full, otherwise either s
T
i will form a blocking pair with at least one of
x1i and x
2
i , or s
F
i will form a blocking pair with at least one of y
1
i and y
2
i . Further, let us
distinguish the following cases.
• {(a5i , s
T
i ), (a
6
i , s
F
i )} ⊆ M. Then, as there are no blocking pairs, {(a
1
i , s
3
i ), (a
2
i , s
4
i )} ⊆
M, which further implies {(a3i , s
2
i ), (a
4
i , s
1
i )} ⊆ M. This, however means that (a
3
i , s
1
i )
and (a4i , s
2
i ) are blocking pairs for M, a contradiction.
• {(x1i , s
T
i ), (x
2
i , s
T
i ), (y
1
i , s
F
i ), (y
2
i , s
F
i )} ⊆ M. Now, to avoid blocking pairs, {(a
5
i , s
3
i ),
(a6i , s
4
i )} ⊆ M, which further implies {(a
1
i , s
1
i ), (a
2
i , s
2
i )} ⊆M. Then there are block-
ing pairs (a3i , s
2
i ) and (a
4
i , s
1
i ), again a contradiction.
The result follows.
Lemma 2. In each stable matching M in J , every applicant in the set {x1i , x
2
i , y
1
i , y
2
i :
1 ≤ i ≤ n} is assigned to her first- or second-choice school.
Proof. For some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, consider applicant x1i (the argument for x
2
i , y
1
i , y
2
i
is similar). Suppose firstly that x1i is unassigned in M. Then (x
1
i , w
1
i,3) blocks M, a
contradiction. Now suppose that (x1i , w
1
i,3) ∈ M. If (q
1
i,3, w
1
i,1) ∈ M then (q
1
i,1, w
1
i,2) ∈
M, for otherwise (q1i,1, w
1
i,1) blocks M. But then (q
1
i,2, w
1
i,2) blocks M, a contradiction.
Thus q1i,3 is unassigned in M. Then (q
1
i,2, w
1
i,1) ∈ M, for otherwise (q
1
i,2, w
1
i,1) blocks M.
Also (q1i,1, w
1
i,2) ∈ M, for otherwise (q
1
i,1, w
1
i,2) blocks M. Hence (q
1
i,3, w
1
i,1) blocks M, a
contradiction.
So, suppose that M is a stable matching in J . We form a truth assignment f in B
as follows. Let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be given. By Lemma 1, either Ti ⊆ M or Fi ⊆ M. In
the former case set f(vi) = true, otherwise set f(vi) = false. Now let vi ∈ V and suppose
that f(vi) = true. Then by Lemma 2, each of yi,1 and yi,2 is assigned to her second choice
school. Now suppose that f(vi) = false. Then again by Lemma 2, each of xi,1 and xi,2
is assigned to her second choice school. Now let cj ∈ C and suppose that all literals in
cj are false. By the preceding remarks about xi,1, xi,2, yi,1 and yi,2 we deduce that zj is
over-subscribed, a contradiction. Thus f is a satisfying truth assignment.
4 Master lists
In some centralized matching schemes all the applicants are ordered in a common master
list. Although the criteria used for creating such lists are often subject to some controversy
(see [11] for the description of the matching scheme for allocating medical students to
hospital posts in England in 2005-06 and [20] for the situation in the central allocation
scheme of teachers in Portugal that was used prior to 2005), computationally the situation
with master lists may be easier. A detailed study of stable matching problems with master
lists from the computational point of view can be found in [13]. In this section we shall
consider the case of a master list of applicants and the (perhaps slightly less realistic) case
of a master list of schools.
The problems of deciding the existence of a stable matching in these cases will be
denoted by tap-am and tap-sm, respectively. The phrase ’s has enough capacity for
a’ used in the algorithms in this section means the following: if a is of type {p, r} then
|Mp(s)| < cp(s) as well as |Mr(s)| < cr(s).
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begin
M := ∅;
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
if ai’s list contains a school with enough free capacity for ai{
s:= first such school on ai’s list ;
M :=M∪{(ai, s)};
}
end
Figure 5: Algorithm Serial Dictatorship
begin
M := ∅;
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
/* let sj’s list be ai1 , . . . , aiℓ */
for r = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ
if air is unassigned and sj has enough capacity for air then
M :=M∪ {(air , sj)};
end
Figure 6: Algorithm Dual Serial Dictatorship
Theorem 2. Let J be an instance of tap-am with the master list a1, a2, . . . , an of appli-
cants. Then J admits a unique stable matching that may be found by an application of
Algorithm Serial Dictatorship as shown in Figure 5.
Proof. It is easy to see that Serial Dictatorship outputs a matching. We have to prove
that this matching is stable and that it is the unique stable matching.
M is stable. Suppose that (ai, sj) is a blocking pair and that i is the smallest index
of an applicant involved in a blocking pair. Since ai has chosen the best available school
from her list, sj did not have enough capacity to accept ai when it was ai’s turn in the
algorithm. However, all the applicants that were assigned to sj at that moment precede
ai in the master list, hence (ai, sj) cannot be a blocking pair.
Uniqueness. LetM′ 6=M be another stable matching and let ai be the first applicant
in the master list with M′(ai) 6=M(ai). As Serial Dictatorship gave ai her best available
school and all applicants who precede ai in the master list have the same assignments
in M as in M′, it must be the case that ai prefers sj = M(ai) to sk = M
′(ai). But
this implies that (ai, sj) is a blocking pair for M
′, as sj will be able to reject one or two
applicants worse than ai in order to free up sufficient capacity for ai (for, sj had enough
room for ai in M when it was ai’s turn during Serial Dictatorship, and any applicant that
precedes ai in the master list has the same assignment in M as she does in M
′).
The situation with a master list of schools, although less likely to occur in practice, is
also efficiently solvable.
Theorem 3. Let J be an instance of tap-sm with the master list of schools s1, s2, . . . , sm.
Then J admits a unique stable matching that may be found by an application of Algorithm
Dual Serial Dictatorship as shown in Figure 6.
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Proof. Let us denote by J(s1) the subinstance of J containing just school s1 and applicants
who apply to s1. J(s1) is an instance of tap-am, so it has a unique stable matching. This
is obtained by Serial dictatorship of applicants that is equivalent with the part of Dual
serial dictatorship within one iteration of the for-cycle for schools. Let us denote this
matching by M1. Let us further observe that no applicant assigned to s1 could be a
member of a blocking pair, as she received her most preferred school. If we now denote by
J(−s1) the subinstance of J with pairs of M1 deleted, the result follows by induction.
5 Subject-specific preference lists
Suppose that a school can order applicants differently for different subjects. The definition
of a blocking pair should now be modified in order to take account of this scenario.
Definition 2. Let M be a matching. We say that a pair (a, s) with p(a) = {p1, p2} and
s ∈ S(A) is blocking if a is not assigned in M or a prefers s to M(a), and one of the
following conditions hold:
(i) s is undersubscribed in both p1 and p2,
(ii) s is undersubscribed in pi and it prefers a in subject p3−i to one applicant inMp3−i(s)
for some i ∈ {1, 2},
(iii) s prefers a in both subjects p1, p2 to one applicant in Mp1,p2(s),
(iv) s prefers a in subject p1 to applicant a1 ∈ Mp1(s) and in subject p2 to another
applicant a2 ∈ Mp2(s).
Let us denote this variant by tap-ss. Define a matching M in a tap-ss instance to
be applicant-complete if every applicant is assigned in M.
Lemma 3. Given an instance of tap-ss, the problem of deciding whether an applicant-
complete stable matching exists is NP-complete. This result holds even if there are at most
three subjects, each partial capacity of a school is at most 1, and the preference lists of the
schools are derived from subject-specific master lists of the applicants.
Proof. We reduce from (2,2)-e3-sat (see the proof of Theorem 1). Let B be an instance of
this problem, where V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables
and clauses respectively in B. We construct an instance J of tap in the following way.
There are 3 subjects, namely F , I and M . For each variable vi (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) there
are 4 applicants x4i+r (0 ≤ r ≤ 3), each of type FI, and 4 schools y4i+r (0 ≤ r ≤ 3). For
each clause cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) there are 4 applicants qj and w
t
j (1 ≤ t ≤ 3), each of type FM ,
and 4 schools stj (1 ≤ t ≤ 4). Let X = {xi : 0 ≤ i ≤ 4n − 1}, Y = {yi : 0 ≤ i ≤ 4n − 1},
W = {wtj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ t ≤ 3}, Q = {qj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, S
′ = {stj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ t ≤
3}, S′′ = {s4j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and S = S
′ ∪ S′′.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), applicants x4i and x4i+1 correspond to the first and second
occurrences of literal vi in B, and applicants x4i+2 and x4i+3 correspond to the first and
second occurrences of literal v¯i in B, respectively. For each r ∈ {0, 1}, let s(x4i+r) denote
the school stj such that the (r+1)th occurrence of literal vi appears in position t of clause
cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ t ≤ 3). Similarly, for each r ∈ {2, 3}, let s(x4i+r) denote the school s
t
j
such that the (r−1)th occurrence of literal v¯i appears in position t of clause cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m,
1 ≤ t ≤ 3).
The applicants’ preferences, together with a summary of their types and a summary of
the schools’ partial capacities, are given in Figure 7. Here, the subscripts and superscripts
involving i, j and t range over the following intervals: 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and
1 ≤ t ≤ 3.
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applicant type preferences school capacities
F I M
x4i FI y4i, s(x4i), y4i+1 y4i 1 1 0
x4i+1 FI y4i+1, s(x4i+1), y4i+2 y4i+1 1 1 0
x4i+2 FI y4i+3, s(x4i+2), y4i+2 y4i+2 1 1 0
x4i+3 FI y4i, s(x4i+3), y4i+3 y4i+3 1 1 0
qj FM s
1
j , s
2
j , s
3
j s
t
j 1 1 1
wtj FM s
t
j , s
4
j s
4
j 1 0 1
Figure 7: The tap-ss instance constructed in the proof of Lemma 3
F : 〈W 〉 〈X〉 〈Q〉
I : 〈X¯〉
M : 〈Q〉 〈W¯ 〉
Figure 8: The master lists for the tap-ss instance constructed in the proof of Lemma 3
We now construct the subject-specific master lists of applicants. Let 〈X〉 denote the
elements of X in increasing order of subscript, and let 〈X¯〉 denote the reverse of this order.
Similarly let 〈W 〉 denote the elements of W listed in increasing order of subscript, and
within this ordering, those elements with equal subscript are listed in increasing order of
superscript. Also let 〈W¯ 〉 denote the reverse of 〈W 〉. Finally let 〈Q〉 denote the elements
of Q listed in increasing order of subscript. The master lists of the applicants with respect
to subjects are shown in Figure 8.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), let us denote Ti = {(x4i+r, y4i+r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} and
Fi = {(x4i+r, y4i+r+1) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 2}∪{(x4i+3, y4i)}. We claim that B has a satisfying truth
assignment if and only if J has an applicant-complete stable matching.
For, let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matching M in J as follows.
For each variable vi ∈ V , if f(vi) = true, add the pairs in Ti to M and if f(vi) = false, add
the pairs in Fi to M. Each clause cj ∈ C contains some literal in cj that is true under f ,
let t be the position of cj containing this true literal (1 ≤ t ≤ 3). Add the following pairs
to M:
{(wt
′
j , s
t′
j ) : 1 ≤ t
′ ≤ 3 ∧ t 6= t′} ∪ {(qj , s
t
j), (w
t
j , s
4
j}.
It is obvious that the defined assignment is an applicant-complete matching; it remains
to prove that it is stable. It is straightforward to verify that no applicant in Q can be
involved in a blocking pair of M, and no pair in X × Y can block M. Now suppose that
(wtj , s
t
j) blocks M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and t (1 ≤ t ≤ 3). Then (w
t
j , s
4
j) ∈ M and
(qj, s
t
j) ∈ M, and school s
t
j prefers qj over w
t
j for subject M , so (w
t
j , s
t
j) cannot block
M after all. Finally suppose that (x4i+r, s(x4i+r)) blocks M for some i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1)
and r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1). Then f(vi) = false by construction of M. Let s
t
j = s(x4i+r). Then
(qj, s
t
j) ∈ M, since (x4i+r, s(x4i+r)) blocks M. But then by construction of M, the tth
literal of cj is true under f , a contradiction. The argument is similar if r ∈ {2, 3}. Hence
M is stable in J .
Conversely suppose that M is an applicant-complete stable matching in J . For any j
(1 ≤ j ≤ m), it follows that (qj, s
t
j) ∈ M for some t (1 ≤ t ≤ 3) and thus (w
t
j, s
4
j ) ∈ M,
since qj and w
t
j must be assigned. Moreover (w
t′
j , s
t′
j ) ∈ M for each t
′ (1 ≤ t′ ≤ 3, t 6= t′).
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Thus M contains no pair of the form (x4i+r, s(x4i+r)) (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3).
Moreover, since each member of X must be assigned in M, we have thus established that
for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), either Ti ⊆M or Fi ⊆M.
Now we construct a truth assignment f in B as follows. If Ti ⊆ M set f(vi) = true
and if Fi ⊆ M set f(vi) = false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth assignment. For,
suppose that some clause cj contains no true literal. As M is an applicant-complete
matching, (qj , s
t
j) ∈ M for some t (1 ≤ t ≤ 3). Now let x4i+r be the applicant such that
s(x4i+r) = s
t
j (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3). If r ∈ {0, 1} then f(vi) = false, so Fi ⊆M. Hence
(x4i+r, s(x4i+r)) blocks M, a contradiction. Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then f(vi) = true, so
Ti ⊆M. Hence (x4i+r, s(x4i+r)) blocks M, again a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Given an instance of tap-ss, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching
exists is NP-complete. This result holds even if there are at most three subjects, each partial
capacity of a school is at most 1, and the preference lists of the schools are derived from
subject-specific master lists of the applicants.
Proof. We show how to modify the reduction presented in the proof of Lemma 3 in order
to ensure that any stable matching in J is applicant-complete. We create a new tap
instance J ′ from J as follows. For each applicant a in J , create two new applicants a′ and
a′′. If a is of type FI, then a′ and a′′ are of type FM and IM respectively. If a is of type
FM , then a′ and a′′ are of type FI and IM respectively. Create a new school g(a) which
has capacity 1 for each of subjects F , I and M . Append g(a) to applicant a’s preference
list in J to obtain her preference list in J ′. Each of applicants a′ and a′′ finds only g(a)
acceptable.
Let X ′ and X ′′ denote the sets of newly-created applicants in J ′ with single and double
primes respectively that correspond to applicants in X. Define R′ and R′′ similarly for the
newly-created applicants in J ′ that correspond to applicants in Q ∪W . For A ∈ {R,X},
let 〈A′〉 and 〈A′′〉 denote arbitrary but fixed orderings of the applicants in A′ and A′′
respectively.
The subject-specific master lists in J ′ are as shown in Figure 9.
F : 〈W 〉 〈X〉 〈Q〉 〈X ′〉 〈R′〉
I : 〈X ′′〉 〈R′〉 〈R′′〉 〈X¯〉
M : 〈R′′〉 〈Q〉 〈W¯ 〉 〈X ′〉 〈X ′′〉
Figure 9: The master lists of the subjects in the tap-ss instance constructed in the proof
of Lemma 4
We show how to modify the proof of Lemma 3 to show that B has a satisfying truth
assignment if and only if J ′ has a stable matching.
Firstly, if f is a satisfying truth assignment of B, construct the matching M in J as
in the proof of Lemma 3. We then extend M to a matching M′ in J ′ as follows. For each
applicant a in J , add the pair (a′, g(a)) to M. Since M is applicant-complete in J , it is
straightforward to verify that M′ is stable in J ′.
Conversely suppose that M′ is a stable matching in J ′. We firstly claim that each
applicant a in J is assigned inM′ to a school better than g(a). For, suppose (a, g(a)) ∈ M′.
Then (a′′, g(a)) blocks M′, a contradiction. Now suppose that a is unassigned in M′.
Clearly some applicant is assigned to g(a) in M′, for otherwise (a, g(a)) blocks M′. If
(a′, g(a)) ∈ M′ then (a, g(a)) blocks M′, whilst if (a′′, g(a)) ∈ M′ then (a′, g(a)) blocks
M′. The claim is thus proved. It is then also straightforward to verify that (a′, g(a)) ∈ M′
for each applicant a in J , for otherwise (a′, g(a)) blocks M′.
11
Let M be the matching obtained from M′ by removing all pairs of the form (a′, g(a)),
where a is an applicant in J . It follows by the previous paragraph thatM is an applicant-
complete stable matching in J . The remainder of the proof is then identical to the converse
direction of the proof of Lemma 3.
Theorem 4. Given an instance of tap-ss, the problem of deciding whether a stable match-
ing exists is NP-complete. This result holds even if there are at most three subjects, each
partial capacity of a school is at most 1, the preference lists of the schools are derived from
subject-specific master lists of the applicants, and the preference lists of the applicants are
derived from a single master list of schools.
Proof. We consider the reduction given by Lemmata 3 and 4, and show that the applicants’
preference lists may be derived from a single master list of schools.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), let 〈Si〉 denote the sequence
〈y4i, s(x4i), s(x4i+3), y4i+3, s(x4i+2), y4i+1, s(x4i+1), y4i+2〉.
Let S4 = {s4j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and let 〈S
4〉 denote an arbitrary order of the schools in S4.
Let G denote the set of schools of the form g(a) as introduced in the proof of Lemma 4
for each applicant a in the original tap-ss instance as constructed in the proof of Lemma
3. Let 〈G〉 denote an arbitrary order of the schools in G. Define the following master list
of schools:
〈S0〉 〈S1〉 . . . 〈Sn−1〉 〈S
4〉 〈G〉
In the proof of Lemma 3, let the preference list of each qj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be reordered
such that the relative ordering of the three schools s1j , s
2
j and s
3
j is derived from the above
master list. This does not change the remainder of the proof of Lemma 3, nor the proof
of Lemma 4. Moreover every other applicant’s preference list is derived from the above
master list of schools. The theorem then follows.
6 “Most stable” matchings
Given an instance of tap, we have already seen that a stable matching need not exist. In
such cases it is natural to seek a matching that is “as stable as possible” in a precise sense.
Here we regard such “most stable” matchings as those that admit the minimum number
of blocking pairs. Note that this approach was also considered in [3].
Clearly min bp tap, the problem of finding such a matching in an instance of tap, is
NP-hard, given Theorem 1. It is then natural to consider the approximability of this prob-
lem. In this section we prove that the problem of finding a matching with the minimum
number of blocking pairs, given an instance of tap, is NP-hard and not approximable
within n1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where n is the number of agents (applicants
plus schools). We show that similar observations hold for min bp tap-ss, the problem of
finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in an instance of tap-ss.
We begin by stating a more general result. Let p be any stable matching problem
for which deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete. Define min bp p to
be the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs, given
an instance I of p. We let opt(I) denote 1 plus the minimum number of blocking pairs
admitted by any matching in I. (We then use opt(I) as the measure against which any
approximation algorithm for p performs, since adding 1 ensures that opt(I) ≥ 1.) We now
present a general inapproximability result for min bp p, and later use it to derive similar
inapproximability results for min bp tap and min bp tap-ss.
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Theorem 5. min bp p is not approximable within n1−ε, where n is the number of agents
in a given instance, for any ε > 0 unless P=NP.
Proof. Let n0 be the number of agents in an instance I of p. Choose c = ⌈2/ε⌉ and k = n
c
0.
Now, let I1, I2, . . . , Ik be k disjoint copies of the instance I. Let I
′ be the instance of p
formed by taking the union of the sub-instances I1, I2, . . . , Ik. Let n = kn0 denote the
number of agents in I ′.
Clearly if I admits a stable matching then each copy of I must admit a stable matching.
Hence opt(I ′) = 1. However, if I admits no stable matching, then each Ir (1 ≤ r ≤ k)
admits only matchings with one or more blocking pair, and hence any matching admitted
by I ′ must admit k or more blocking pairs. Hence opt(I ′) ≥ k + 1. We now show that
n1−ε ≤ k.
Firstly n = kn0 ≤ 2kn0 = 2n
c+1
0 . Hence
n
2
≤ nc+10
which implies (n
2
)1/(c+1)
≤ n0.
Since k = nc0 it follows that (n
2
)c/(c+1)
≤ k
and hence
2−c/(c+1)nc/(c+1) ≤ k. (1)
We know that n = kn0 = n
c+1
0 ≥ n
c
0 and we lose no generality by assuming that
n0 ≥ 2. Hence n ≥ 2
c and it follows that n−1 ≤ 2−c and thus
n−1/(c+1) ≤ 2−c/(c+1). (2)
Hence
n−1/(c+1)nc/c+1 ≤ 2−c/(c+1)nc/(c+1) (3)
and it follows that
n(c−1)/(c+1) = nc/(c+1)n−1/(c+1) ≤ 2−c/(c+1)nc/(c+1) ≤ k. (4)
We now show that n1−ε ≤ n(c−1)/(c+1). Observe that c ≥ 2/ε and thus c+1 ≥ 2/ε. Hence
1− ε ≤ 1−
2
c+ 1
≤
c− 1
c+ 1
and hence by Inequality 4, n1−ε ≤ k.
Now, assume that X is an approximation algorithm for p with a performance guarantee
of n1−ε. If I admits a stable matching, X must return a matching in I ′ with measure at
most opt(I).n1−ε = n1−ε ≤ k, since opt(I) = 1. Otherwise, I ′ does not admit a stable
matching and, as shown above, X must return a matching with measure ≥ k + 1. Thus
algorithm X may be used to determine whether I admits a stable matching in polynomial
time, a contradiction. Hence, no such polynomial approximation algorithm can exist unless
P = NP.
Theorem 5 allows us to state the following corollaries for the inapproximability of min
bp tap and min bp tap-ss.
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Corollary 1. min bp tap is not approximable within n1−ε, where n is the number of
agents in a given instance, for any ε > 0 unless P=NP. This result holds even if there are
at most three subjects, each partial capacity of a school is at most 2, and the preference
list of each applicant is of length at most 3.
Proof. This result follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 5.
Corollary 2. min bp tap-ss is not approximable within n1−ε, where n is the number of
agents in a given instance, for any ε > 0 unless P=NP. This result holds even if there
are at most three subjects, each partial capacity of a school is at most 1, the preference
lists of the schools are derived from subject-specific master lists of the applicants, and the
preference lists of the applicants are derived from a single master list of schools.
Proof. This result follows immediately from Theorems 4 and 5.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the notion of stability in the Teachers Assignment Problem from
the computational perspective. Notice that when there are only two different subjects in
total, then all the applicants are of the same type and the problem reduces to the classical
Hospitals / Residents problem. However, the presence of just three subjects makes the
problem of deciding the existence of a stable matching intractable, unless there is a master
list of applicants or a master list of schools. By contrast, if the schools may order applicants
differently in each of their specialization subjects, then even subject-specific master lists
plus the master list of schools do not make the problem tractable. Thus we have been able
to characterize the borderline between the polynomially solvable and intractable cases of
the Teachers Assignment Problem.
Further, we proved a general inapproximability result for the problem of finding a
matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs. This implies that, if P 6= NP , there
is no polynomial approximation algorithm with performance guarantee n1−ε for finding a
matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in both preference variants of the
Teachers Assignment Problem.
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